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This paper proposes a new strategy to improve the reliability
of phased mission systems (PMS), namely by swapping of
components. In the proposed strategy, when a component
fails, it can be swapped by another one in the system which
is still functioning. We consider both the options to swap
components at any time and for swaps to be possible only
at phase transitions. This paper also discusses the strategy
of swapping components according to structure importance.
The structure importance is used to measure the importance
level of the components in contributing to system reliability.
Then when a component with high importance fails, it is
swapped by another component with lower importance from
the system which has not yet failed. The survival signature
methodology is implemented to assess the reliability of
PMS when there is a possibility of components swapping.
In addition, we consider the cost effectiveness of component
swapping through two models (time independent and time
dependent) of penalty costs for PMS.
Keyword: Phased mission system, Survival signature,
Component swapping, Penalty cost, Structural importance
1 Introduction
A phased mission system (PMS) is defined as a system
which performs a series of tasks in consecutive and non-
overlapping periods (phases). In order for a PMS to accom-
plish its mission successfully, each phase has to be completed
without any failure [1]. Therefore, the reliability of a PMS is
the probability that the system functions in all phases. A dis-
tinct feature of a PMS is that the system configuration varies
between phases and the functioning of components in differ-
ent phases is dependent. This feature makes the reliability
analysis of PMS more complex than the reliability analysis
of a single phase system.
Over the past few decades, there has been extensive re-
search to analyse the reliability of a PMS. Some researchers
focus on modelling the dependence among system com-
ponents using state-based approaches, which are based on
Markov models or Petri nets [2–5]. Other approaches are
based on combinatorial methods, such as binary decision di-
agram or multi-valued decision diagram based models [6–9].
Recently, a combinatorial analytical approach providing a
new survival signature methodology for reliability analysis
of PMS has been introduced [10]. The use of the survival
signature is attractive as it separates the system structure
from the component lifetime distributions, which simplifies
the PMS reliability computation and related statistical anal-
ysis [11–13].
It is often difficult for a PMS to work with high reliabil-
ity. Generally, there are mainly two approaches that can be
used to improve the reliability of the PMS. The first way is
increasing the component reliability (reliability allocation),
and the other way is using redundant components in parallel
(redundancy allocation) e.g. [14–17]. Unfortunately, these
two approaches will increase the cost of the PMS and do not
always yield competitive results. Recently, a new attractive
strategy called ‘component swapping’ has been introduced
to improve the reliability of a single phased mission sys-
tem [18]. Component swapping is defined basically as the
possibility to swap a component upon failure by another one
in the system, which has not yet failed [18]. The strategy of
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component swapping is attractive in its nature since it will
not increase the weight and volume of the system. In this pa-
per, we propose the approach of swapping components upon
failure to prevent the PMS from failing. In addition, we dis-
cuss the strategy of swapping components according to struc-
ture importance, as an example of a method to decide which
components may be considered for swapping.
It is attractive if we can consider the possibility of swap-
ing components at any time during the mission. However,
this may not be possible in some PMS, so we also consider
the case that swaps between components are only possible at
transitions of phases. In this paper, we use the survival signa-
ture methodology for PMS, as introduced by [10], to analyse
the effect of swapping components on the PMS reliability
when the components can be swapped at any time during
the mission or only at transitions of phases. Some costs are
likely related to enabling both swapping scenarios. In this
paper, we also establish models for evaluating the expected
costs for the PMS if there is a possibility to swap compo-
nents at any time during the mission or only at transitions of
phases.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents
a brief background on PMS. Section 3 considers the effect
of swapping components upon failure on the PMS reliabil-
ity. Section 4 presents the effect of swapping components
according to reliability importance on the PMS reliability.
Section 5 demonstrates two cost models to analyse the ex-
pected costs of the failure of the PMS if the components can
be swapped. The material in Sections 3-5 is all novel and
forms the main contribution of this paper to the literature.
We present illustrative examples in each section. We end the
paper with some concluding remarks in Section 6.
2 Phased mission systems
A PMS performs a sequence of functions or tasks during
consecutive phases to accomplish a specific mission. Gen-
erally, in a PMS, each phase corresponds to one configura-
tion and the configuration changes from phase to phase. The
states of the same component in different phases are mutu-
ally dependent. The PMS might have the same components
in each phase or the components might vary from phase to
phase. In this paper we consider only PMS with the same
components used in each phase, as it simplifies the survival
signature approach as shown in [10], and it still provides the
opportunity to fully show how component swapping can be
implemented in PMS and how the resulting system reliability
improvement can be quantified, which is the main contribu-
tion of this paper. The presented approach for component
swapping for PMS can quite straightforwardly be general-
ized to PMSs with different components in each phase using
the survival signature method introduced by [10]. The key
contribution of this current paper is the introduction of com-
ponent swapping in PMS, which has not been considered be-
fore. It needs to be emphasized that, in this paper, both the
system and its components are assumed to be non-repairable
during the mission, so if a component fails to function at the
end of a certain phase, then it cannot work again in subse-
quent phases.
Consider a PMS with n components, with N ≥ 2 phases.
The state of component j ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n} in phase i, i ∈
{1,2, · · · ,N} can be represented as a binary variable Xi, j,
such that Xi, j = 1 if component j functions for all of phase i
and Xi, j = 0 if component j fails before the end of phase i.
The state of the system in phase i can then be described by a
binary function
φi = φi(Xi) = φi(Xi,1, · · · ,Xi,n) (1)
where φi = 1 represents that the system functions success-
fully for the entire phase i and φi = 0 represents failure to do
so. The vector Xi = (Xi,1, ...,Xi,n) represents the states of all
components at the end of phase i.
Similarly, the structure function of the PMS is also a
binary variable which is completely determined by the states
of all the components during the mission
φs = φs(X) = φi(X1,1, · · · ,X1,n, · · · ,XN,1, · · · ,XN,n) (2)
where X = (X1, ...,XN) = (X1,1, ...,X1,n, ...,XN,1, ...,XN,n) is
the state vector of the components during the entire phased
mission. Because a PMS is functioning if and only if all its
phases are completed without failure, the structure function





φi(Xi,1, · · · ,Xi,n) (3)
So, φs = 1 indicates successful functioning of the system to
complete the mission, while φs = 0 indicates failure of the
system to complete the mission successfully.
3 Swapping components upon failure
In this section, we consider the strategy of swapping
components upon failure to increase PMS reliability under
two scenarios. First, we assume that if a component fails
at any time during the mission, it can be swapped by an-
other one which is still functioning. Secondly, we assume
that component swapping is only possible at transitions of
phases. A swap between components is logically restricted
to components of the same type and it can only be done if
the system cannot function with the existing components in
place.
While this paper presents the mathematical theory for
component swapping in PMS, it is important to briefly con-
sider the type of systems that may well enable application of
this theory. A first category is critical systems which cannot
easily be maintained, for example systems for use in space.
One could consider computer systems as components of such
systems being set up such that a computer intended for use of
a less critical task could take over a critical task upon failure
of the computer intended for that task. As a very different
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system, one could think about staff in an organisation, where
it may be possible to provide additional training for some
staff, enabling them to take over duties for other staff if nec-
essary, for example if the latter fall ill during crucial periods.
As an example close to home, at a university department it
may be needed that other staff take over exam marking du-
ties, under tight deadlines, if the main examiner is ill. A
further example would be sound or light systems for con-
certs, where spare parts or equipment may not be available
but the position of a failing component may be more crucial
than of another component, which could possibly be quickly
swapped into the location of the failed component, although
this may only be possible at an interval in the performance.
3.1 PMS with a single type of components
Consider a system with n components of the same type
that performs a N ≥ 2 phase mission. Phase i ∈ {1,2, ...,N}
runs from time τi−1 to time τi with τ0 = 0 and τi−1 < τi for
all i ∈ {1,2, ...,N}. The survival signature ΦS (l1, l2, ...lN)
denotes the probability that the PMS functions by the end
of the mission given that precisely li, i ∈ {1,2, ...,N}, of its
components functioned in phase i. It is assumed that the ran-
dom failure times of components in the same phase are inde-
pendent and identically distributed [10]. If N(t) ≤ N is the
phase that the system is in at time t, the survival signature of





















where S denotes the set of all possible state vectors for which
li components function in phase i, and mi is the number of
components that function at the beginning of phase i. Be-
cause both the system and its components are non-repairable
during the mission, the number of components that function
at the beginning of phase i should be equal to the number
of components that function at the end of phase i− 1. So,
mi = li−1 while m1 = n [10]. The reliability of the PMS at















Ci(t) denotes the number of components that function in
phase i at time t ∈ [τi−1,τi). If the components have a com-
mon CDF F(t), its conditional CDF in phase i is Fi(t) at
time t ∈ [τi−1,τi), conditioned on the system working at the
beginning of phase i, this conditional CDF is
Fi(t) = [F(min{t,τi})−F(τi−1)]/ [1−F(τi−1)] (6)





















We assume that there are fixed swapping rules, which
prescribe upon failure of a component precisely which other
component takes over its role in the system, if possible and if
the other component is still functioning, in order to prevent
the system from failure, and we further assume that such a
swap of components takes neglectable time and does not af-
fect the functioning of the component that changes its role in
the PMS nor its remaining time until failure. The assumption
of neglectable time needed for a component swap is mainly
for mathematical convenience, but is reasonable if a swap
of components only takes a very small amount of time com-
pared to the period over which the system functions. We
can take the effect of the defined swaps, if they are appli-
cable at any time during the mission or only at transitions of
phases, into account through the PMS structure function, and
hence, it can be taken into account for computation of the
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where φ(W )s (X) and φ
(E)
s (X) are the structure functions of
the PMS considering the defined swaps at any time during
the mission or only at transition of phases, respectively, φ(E)s
will typically be equal to 1 for some X for which φs was
equal to 0 and φ(W )s will typically be equal to 1 for some X
for which φ(E)s was equal to 0, so φ
(W )
s ≥ φ(E)s ≥ φs. The re-
liability of PMS can be calculated straightforwardly in both
scenarios by substituting the survival signature of the original
PMS in Equation (7) by the survival signatures that consider
the swapping scenarios in Equations (8) and (9). It is impor-
tant to notice here that the swap in both scenarios is entirely
reflected in the PMS survival signature, and the conditional
failure time of the components remains the same as for the
original system.
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3.2 PMS with multiple types of components
Consider a system with N ≥ 2 phases, and with K types
of components in each phase. Components are said to be of
the same type if their failure times are exchangeable [11–13].
In practice, this can perhaps be best understood as follows.
Suppose there are, say, 6 components of the same type in
a system; if you receive the information that any number
of these 6 components has failed by a certain time, then
you have no idea which specific components actually have
failed, all subsets of the same size are equally likely to be
the failed components. Let phase i run from time τi−1 to
time τi with τ0 = 0 and τi−1 < τi for all i ∈ {1,2, ...,N}. Let
ΦS (l1,1, ..., l1,K , ..., lN,1, ..., lN,K) denote the probability that
the PMS functions given that precisely li,k components of
type k function at the end of phase i, for all i ∈ {1,2, ...,N}
and k ∈ {1,2, ...,K}. Because the failure times of the compo-
nents of the same type are assumed to be exchangeable, the
survival signature of the first N(t) phases is
ΦS
(
















where N(t)≤N is the phase that the system is in at time t and
S denotes the set of all possible state vectors for which there
are possibly li,k components of type k functioning at the end
of phase i. The number of components of type k that function
at the beginning of phase i is mi,k. As pointed out in Section
3.1, because both the system and its components are non-
repairable during the mission, the number of components of
type k that function at the beginning of phase i is equal to the
number of components of type k that function at the end of
phase i− 1. So, mi,k = li−1,k while m1,k = nk is the number
of components of type k in the system. The reliability of the























where Ci,k(t) is the number of components of type k that
function in phase i at time t ∈ [τi−1,τi). If the components
of type k in phase i have common CDF Fk(t), its conditional
CDF in phase i is Fi,k(t) at time t ∈ [τi−1,τi) conditional on
the system working at the beginning of phase i, and it is equal
to
Fi,k(t) = [Fk(min{t,τi})−Fk(τi−1)]/ [1−Fk(τi−1)] (12)








































As in Section 3.1, if it is assumed that there are fixed swap-
ping rules and that a swap of components takes neglectable
time, then we can study the effect of the defined swaps if they
are applicable at any time during the mission or only at tran-
sitions of phases, through the PMS structure function, and
hence, it can be taken into account for computation of the
system reliability through the PMS survival signature. This
approach is illustrated and explained in more detail in the
next two examples.
3.3 Example 1
Consider the PMS in Fig. 1 that consists of three com-
ponents performing a three-phase mission. All the compo-
nents are of the same type and work independently from one
another in each phase. The lifetime distribution of the com-
ponents in each phase follows an Exponential distribution
and the failure rates of phases 1, 2 and 3 are 2× 10−3/hour,
1×10−4/hour and 2×10−4/hour, respectively. The duration
of all three phases are 10 hours each.
The method in Section 3.1 is used to examine the reli-
ability of this PMS if components 1 and 2 can be swapped
upon failure at any time during the mission or only at transi-
tions of phases.
In both scenarios, the opportunity of the swap is taken
into account through the structure functions. For example,
the state vector (0,1,0) represents the situation when com-
ponents 1 and 3 fail during phase 1, but component 2 is
still functioning, in this case, φ1(0,1,0) = φ
(E)
1 (0,1,0) = 0,
however, φ(W )1 (0,1,0) = 1, because in this scenario the com-
ponent 2 would be swapped by component 1 during phase
1. The state vector (0,1,1,0,1,1) represents the situation
when component 1 fails during phase 1, but components 2
and 3 continue to function until the end of phase 2. In this





1,2 (0,1,1,0,1,1) = 1, because component 1 would be
swapped by component 2 at the time of transition to phase
2 in order to continue the mission of phase 2.
Table 1 shows the results of the survival signatures for
the original PMS ΦS and the survival signature if compo-
nents 1 and 2 are swappable any time during the mission
Φ
(W )
S or only at transitions of phases Φ
(E)
S . The first group
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The first phase The first two phases The PMS














1 1/3 2/3 1/3 2 2 2/3 1 1 2 2 2 1/3 1 1
2 1 1 1 3 2 2/3 1 2/3 3 2 2 1/3 1 2/3
3 1 1 1 3 3 1 1 1 3 3 2 2/3 1 2/3
3 3 3 1 1 1
Table 1. Survival signatures of PMS shown in Example 1
t 10− 10+ 20− 20+ 30
R 0.9992 0.9798 0.9788 0.9589 0.9569
R(W ) 0.9996 0.9988 0.9987 0.9987 0.9985
R(E) 0.9992 0.9988 0.9978 0.9978 0.9957
Table 2. Reliability of the PMS in Example 1
of results are the survival signatures of phase 1, the second
group of results contains the survival signatures of the first
two phases and the last group of results represents the sur-
vival signatures of the whole PMS. Entries for which the sur-
vival signatures are 0 are omitted.
The reliability R of the original PMS is shown in Ta-
ble 2 and presented by the solid line in Fig. 2. As shown in
Table 2 and Fig. 2, there are reliability jumps at t = 10 and
t = 20. The reason is that if component 1 has failed in phase
1, the PMS may still function in phase 1, however, the PMS
will fail immediately when it steps into phase 2. Similarly, if
component 2 has failed in phase 2, the system can still func-
tion in phase 2 when component 3 is functioning, however,
the system will fail immediately when it steps into phase 3.
The reliability of the PMS when the swap is applicable
at any time during the mission or only at transition of phases,
R(W ) and R(E), respectively, are also given in Table 2 and pre-




i , i ∈ {1,2,3},
denote the reliability of the original PMS and the reliabil-
ity in both swap scenarios in phase i. The results show that
the reliability jumps at t = 10 and t = 20 are greatly reduced
(or even eliminated) when the specified swapping of com-
ponents is possible. The reason is that if component 1 has
failed in phase 2, we can replace it with component 2 if this
still functions. Similarly, if component 2 has failed in phase
3, it can be replaced by component 1 if this still functions.
3.4 Example 2
Consider the PMS in Fig. 3 that consists of five com-
ponents performing a three-phase mission. The components
follow Weibull and Exponential distributions and can be di-
vided into two types according to the distribution of the life
time. Table 3 summarizes the distribution information of
the components in each phase. For the Weibull distribu-
tion, F(t) = 1−e−(t/β)α , α and β are the scale parameter and
















































Phase 1 α = 180, β = 2.2 λ = 1×10−3
Phase 2 α = 400, β = 3.2 λ = 1×10−4
Phase 3 α = 200, β = 2.4 λ = 2×10−4
Table 3. The distribution information of the components in Fig. 3
shape parameter, respectively. For the Exponential distribu-
tion, F(t) = 1−e−λt where λ is the failure rate. Assume that
phases 1, 2 and 3 last for 10, 270 and 20 hours, respectively.
The method in Section 3.2 is used to examine the relia-
bility of this PMS if components 1 and 2 are swappable, and
components 3 and 4 are swappable, with swaps either pos-
sible upon failure at any time during the mission or only at
transition of phases. For example, in phase 1, if the swap is
applicable at any time during the mission, then we can swap
component 1 to 2 when component 2 fails but component
1 stills function, and we can swap component 3 to 4 when
components 1, 4 and 5 fail but component 3 still functions.
The reliability of the PMS is shown in Table 4 and Fig. 4,
using the same notations as in Table 2 and Fig. 2.
The results show that there is a reliability jump at the
transition of phases 2 and 3 in the original PMS. The reason
is that if components 1 and 3 or components 2, 4 and 5 have
all failed simultaneously in phase 2, then the PMS still func-
tions in phase 2, but the PMS will fail immediately when it
steps into phase 3. The operation of component swapping
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t 10− 10+ 280− 280+ 300
R 0.998269 0.998269 0.9970 0.9875 0.9764
R(W ) 0.999996 0.999996 0.9994 0.9992 0.9984
R(E) 0.998269 0.998269 0.9972 0.9970 0.9836
Table 4. Reliability of the PMS in Example 2
































Fig. 4. Reliability of the PMS in Example 2
upon failure nearly eliminates the reliability jump between
these phases. The reason for this is that, if components 1 and
3 both failed in phase 2, then component 1 can be swapped
by 2 or component 3 can be swapped by 4. Also, if compo-
nents 2, 4 and 5 all failed in phase 2, then components 2 or 4
can be swapped by 1 or 3, respectively. The results show that
the reliability of PMS is significantly improved as a result of
possible swapping of components upon failure.
4 Swapping components according to structure impor-
tance
When considering swapping opportunities for compo-
nents, and important practical question is how to determine
which components can actually be swapped. This can only
meaningfully be assessed in practice for real-world systems,
so it is beyond the scope of this paper. However, in order to
show how such decisions could be linked to system proper-
ties, we illustrate the idea that defining possible swaps could
be based on components’ importance measures. In partic-
ular, we consider the strategy of swapping components ac-
cording to structure importance to improve the reliability of
PMS. In this strategy, the structure importance is used to
measure the importance level of the components in contribut-
ing to system reliability, then when a component with high
importance fails, it is swapped by another component with
lower importance from the system which has not yet failed.
If the component is swapped according to the structure im-
portance criterion, the swap will take place with disregard
of whether or not the system can continue to function with
the existing components in place, depending on the level of
the importance of the component that has failed. However,
as we have seen in the previous section, if the component is
swapped upon failure, then the swap takes place only if the
PMS cannot continue to function with the existing compo-
nents in place.
Since it is assumed that only components of the same
type are swappable, the structural importance which mea-
sures the relative importance of components with respect to
their positions is sufficient to prioritize the components in
each phase [19]. The structural importance of component j ∈
{1,2, · · · ,n} for the configuration in phase i ∈ {1,2, · · · ,N},





φi(1 j,x j)−φi(0 j,x j)
]
(14)
where φi(·) is the structure function of the system in phase i;
x j represents the component state vector with x j removed,
(1 j,x j) and (0 j,x j) represent the component vector when
component j in phase i is in state 1 or 0, respectively, and
2n−1 is the total number of different state vectors with n−1
elements.
After the components are prioritized by structural im-
portance, the swapping rules are defined upon this prioriti-
zation, so it is assumed that when a component with high
importance fails, it is swapped by another component of the
same type with lower importance which has not yet failed. It
is assumed further that the swap between components takes
neglectable time and does not affect the functioning state of
the component that changes its role in the PMS nor its re-
maining time until failure.
We can calculate the reliability of a PMS after we define
the swapping rules according to the structural importance,
in the same way as in Section 3. We consider the effect of
the defined swaps, either if they are applicable at any time
during the mission or only at transitions of phases, into ac-
count through the PMS structure function, and hence, it can
be taken into account for computation of the system relia-
bility through the PMS survival signature. This approach is
illustrated and explained in more detail in the following ex-
ample.
4.1 Example 3
Consider again the system in Fig. 3 and we keep the
same scenario for the phases duration and the conditional
lifetime distribution of the components in each phase as in
Example 2. Structural importance analysis is conducted to
measure the importance of the components in contributing
to system reliability in each phase, the results are shown in
Table 5. The results show the orders of structure importances



























5 . Therefore, for the components
of type 1, if components 1 and 2 are swappable, we can swap
component 1 to 2 in phases 1 when component 2 fails but

































0.44 0.19 0.44 0.19 0.19
Table 5. Structure importance for the configuration in each phase in
Fig. 3
component 1 still functions. And we can swap component 2
to 1 in phase 3. Similarly, for the components of type 2, if
components 3 and 4 are swappable, we can swap component
3 to 4 in phase 1 when component 4 fails but component 2
still functions. Moreover, component 4 can take over the role
of component 3 in phases 2 and 3 when component 3 fails but
component 4 still functions.
The resulting reliability functions are shown in Fig. 5
with the specific values around transition times given in Ta-
ble 6. Comparing these results with the results in Example
2 in which the components are swapped upon failure, we
find that the reliability in phase 1 and 2, if the components 1
and 2 are swappable, and the components 3 and 4 are swap-
pable according to their structural importances are exactly
the same as if these components are swapped upon failure,
however, in phase 3, the results are different. The reason is
that there are some cases of the swaps that happen when the
components are swapped upon failure but not happen when
the components swapped according to their structural impor-
tance, and vice versa. For example, if the swaps are applica-
ble at any time during the mission, when the components 1
and 4 function and components 2, 3 and 5 are failed in phase
3, the PMS continues to function when the components are
swapped upon failure, since there is no need for component
swapping in this case, however, when the components are
swapped according to their structural importances, the sys-
tem will have failed since in this case component 4 has taken
over the role of component 3, because component 4 is clas-
sified as less importance than 3.
The results also show that the reliability jump at the tran-
sition of phases 2 and 3 in the original PMS is reduced when
the components are swapped according to its structural im-
portance. However, the amount of reduction that is gained
if the components are swapped upon failure, is more than
if they are swapped according to their structure importance.
The reason for this is that if the components are swapped ac-
cording to their structure importances, if the components 2, 4
and 5 all failed during phase 2, then components 2 and 4 can-
not be swapped by components 1 and 3, respectively, when
needed, as in the case when the components are swapped
































Fig. 5. Reliability of the PMS in Example 3
t 10− 10+ 280− 280+ 300
R 0.998269 0.998269 0.9970 0.9875 0.9764
R(W ) 0.999996 0.999996 0.9994 0.9982 0.9965
R(E) 0.998269 0.998269 0.9972 0.9964 0.9944
Table 6. Reliability of the PMS in Example 3
upon failure.
5 Cost penalty for failure of PMS with component
swapping
In this section, we establish models for evaluating the
expected penalty costs of system failure and component
swaps. This is important for decisions on whether or not to
facilitate component swaps. We consider two basic cost sce-
narios for system down-time, namely a single fixed penalty
cost, independent of the length of the system down-time, and
a penalty cost proportional to down-time.
5.1 Time independent penalty costs
Suppose that we have a PMS which needs to perform a
sequence of missions in a certain period of time [τ0,τN ]. The
system must function during all the phases. If the system
fails at any time during phase i before τN , then a fixed penalty






where p j, j = i, · · · ,N, is a specific cost resulting for phase
j not being completed. We assume that p j is independent
of the failure time during phase j. Let τ−i represent the last
moment in phase i and CS denote the expected cost of failure
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As described in Sections 3 and 4, the reliability of PMSs
can be improved by swapping components either at any time
during the mission or only at the transition of phases. An
upfront cost may need to be paid to enable each swapping
scenario. Let b denote the cost to enable a regime of specified
swaps at any time during the mission and e denote the cost
to enable a regime of specified swaps only at the transition
of phases. Let CWS and C
E
S denote the expected costs of the
PMS in these scenarios, respectively. These expected costs























5.2 Time dependent penalty costs
In practical engineering, the cost penalty for failure of a
PMS may be time dependent. Let the penalty cost per unit of
time in phase i be ui. If the system fails at time TS ∈ [τi−1,τi),
then the down time is (τi−TS)+∑Nk=i+1(τk− τk−1) for i ∈
{1,2, · · · ,N}. If the system fails during phase i, the expected


















where τ+i−1 represents the first moment in phase i and τ
−
i rep-
resents the last moment in phase i, and f (t) is the probability
density function of the failure time of the PMS. If the system
fails at τi, then the expected penalty costs are






























Similarly, as shown above with time independent
penalty costs, if b denotes the cost to enable a regime of spec-
ified swaps at any time during the mission and e denotes the
cost to enable a regime of specified swaps only at the transi-
tion of phases, then the expected costs in both scenarios are


























































Consider again the PMS with the single type of compo-
nents in Fig. 1. We keep the same scenario for the duration
of all the three phases and for the conditional lifetime dis-
tribution of the components in each phase as in Example 1.
We also consider the same scenario for the swapping oppor-
tunity as in Example 1, namely components 1 and 2 can be
swapped upon failure. Assume that the penalty costs allo-
cated to phase 1, 2, and 3 are p1 = 1× 103, p2 = 8× 102
and p3 = 5× 102, respectively. These penalty costs are in-
dependent of the failure time during or before the phases. If
the cost to enable the swap at any time during the mission
is b = 50, and the cost to enable the swap only at the transi-
tions of phases is e = 3, then the expected costs for the orig-
inal PMS and the expected costs in both swap scenarios are
CS = 39.28, CWS = 52.1 and C
E
S = 7.72, respectively. Thus,
the best option is to take the opportunity to enable the swap
only at the transitions of phases. If the penalty costs are time
dependent and u1 = 1×103, u2 = 8×102 and u3 = 5×102,
then CS = 378.71, CWS = 68.07 and C
E
S = 35.49. There-
fore, while taking the opportunity of both swapping scenar-
ios would reduce the expected costs, the maximum reduction
is obtained when the swap is applicable only at the transitions
of phases.
5.4 Example 5
Consider again the same PMS with multiple types of
components in Fig. 3. We keep the same scenario for the
duration of all three phases and for the conditional lifetime
distributions of the components in each phase as in Exam-
ples 2 and 3. Also, we consider the same scenario for the
swapping cases as in Examples 2 and 3, namely that com-
ponents 1 and 2 are swappable, and components 3 and 4
are swappable. If the fixed penalty costs are independent
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of the failure time during the phases, set at p1 = 1× 103,
p2 = 8×102 and p3 = 5×102, then the expected costs for the
original PMS is CS = 15.87. If b = 50 and e = 3, then the ex-
pected costs for both swap scenarios, when the components
are swapped upon failure as in Example 2, are CWS = 51.32
and CES = 15.15. If the components are swapped according
to the structure importance, as in Example 3, then the ex-
pected costs for both swap scenarios are CWS = 52.28 and
CES = 16.77. Therefore, for possible swap upon failure, it is
best to take the opportunity to enable the swap only at the
transitions of phases. But when the swap is according to the
structure importance, then it is better not to take the option
of any swap scenarios. This is because the improvement that
is gained in the reliability when the components are swapped
upon failure is more than if they are swapped according to
the structure importance.
If the penalty costs are dependent on the failure time
during the phases, set at u1 = 1× 103, u2 = 8× 102 and
u3 = 5× 102, then the expected costs for the original PMS
is CS = 615.38. The expected costs for both swap sce-
narios when the components are swapped upon failure are
CWS = 90.63 and C
E
S = 526.99, and when the components
are swapped according to the structure importance the ex-
pected costs are CWS = 105.41 and C
E
S = 473.02. It is clear
that, although the best option in both swapping strategies is
to take the opportunity to enable the swap at any time dur-
ing the mission, the expected costs when the components are
swapped upon failure are less than if they are swapped ac-
cording to the structure importance.
6 Concluding remarks
A phased mission system (PMS) is one that performs
several different tasks or functions in sequence. In order to
accomplish the mission successfully, the system has to com-
plete every phase without failure. Therefore, it is often diffi-
cult for a PMS to work with high reliability. In this paper, we
introduced the strategy of swapping components upon failure
that is introduced in [18], to improve the reliability of PMS.
In addition, we discussed the strategy of swapping compo-
nents according to structure importance, as an example of
the use of component reliability characteristics for determin-
ing possible swaps. In practice, specific system design will
mostly determine which components may be swappable, this
will be an important topic for future research which neces-
sarily must be considered in direct relation to a real-world
PMS. The survival signature methodology for PMS, that is
introduced in [10], is used to analyse the effect of compo-
nent swapping on the reliability of the PMS, comparing the
scenario when the swap between components is applicable
at any time during the mission with the scenario when it is
applicable only at transitions of phases. Considering the ap-
proach of component swapping to increase the reliability of
the PMS is attractive since the reliability and number of com-
ponents do not need to be increased to improve the system
reliability.
In this paper, we derived two models (time independent
and time dependent) of penalty costs for PMS, in order to
compare the expected costs for the PMS when there is a pos-
sibility to swap components with the option not to enable
swaps. This shows that although an upfront cost might need
to be paid to enable each swapping scenario, the operation of
component swapping either at any time during the mission
or only at transitions of phases might contribute significantly
to reducing the expected costs of the PMS. These indicators
are useful in security assessment and risk management under
the constraint of costs.
A major topic for future research is up-scaling this ap-
proach to large real-world systems. In principle there are
no difficulties for as far as the effect of swapping opportuni-
ties is concerned, the challenge is mostly in the computation
of the survival signatures for the system without swaps en-
abled, and with swaps enabled. If only few swaps are possi-
ble, these survival signatures will largely be identical, which
should give a route to efficient computation. In general, the
topic of computing the survival signature for large systems
is crucial, and continues to receive substantial attention. An
advantage is the fact that the survival signature of coherent
systems is monotonously increasing as function of the num-
bers of functioning components, which is particularly useful
for the possibility to derive approximations or bounds for the
survival signature. Such bounds may already be sufficient to
answer practical questions which require the system reliabil-
ity function as input.
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